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ABSTRACT 
This capstone explores the applicability of the Systems-Theoretic Accident 
Model and Processes (STAMP) framework and the System-Theoretic Process Analysis 
(STPA) methodology to guide consideration of system safety concerns posed by future 
variants of Sea Hunter. The author analyzed the Sea Hunter’s navigational mission 
behaviors from a high-level perspective of a functional hierarchy, discussing the specific 
steps of how basic STAMP/STPA can be used to identify safety hazards and safety 
hazard casual factors on a complex system such as Sea Hunter. Using the STAMP/STPA 
methodology, the author provides a functional hierarchy example of the potential system 
safety hazards involved on the different hierarchy levels in the steering system on Sea 
Hunter. This capstone discusses how STAMP/STPA can be used to identify system-level 
hazards, identify unsafe control actions, and identify loss scenarios in the example. The 
U.S. Navy needs to ensure that its assessment capabilities can be used to adequately 
identify and evaluate safety hazards, safety hazard causal factors, safety controls, and 
safety risks of autonomous weapons systems (AWS). AWSs are defined as weapons that 
can independently select and attack targets. STAMP/STPA is a promising approach to 
safety analysis; further examination of its applicability and utility in the context of AWS 
is recommended. If beneficial, this toolset could help the U.S. Navy accelerate the 
development of fully autonomous technology. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Machines can do many things, but they cannot create meaning. They cannot 
answer these questions for us. Machines cannot tell us what we value, what 
choices we should make. The world we are creating is one that will have 
intelligent machines in it, but it is not for them. It is a world for us. 
—Paul Scharre [1] 
Any policy decision to implement fully autonomous weapon systems (AWS) for 
autonomous platforms will constitute a major paradigm shift in U.S. military operations. 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) guide U.S. military 
tactics. Sound decision-making is required when offensively targeting or defensively 
responding to adversaries’ actions. The context is problematic. Even experienced 
combatants with state-of-the-art decision-support systems face challenges posed by the fog 
and high tempo of modern warfare. This makes one wonder how well artificially intelligent 
defense systems will perform the decision-making, acting autonomously or in a 
cooperative manner, on behalf of a warfighter. If Murphy’s Law holds, one can expect 
something to go wrong, such as mistakenly treating a commercial fishing vessel as a lawful 
military target. 
A commander cannot delegate the legal responsibility for ensuring their forces are 
faithfully following the LOAC and their command-specific ROE. Under tactical control 
(TACON), if an employed AWS takes actions that violate the LOAC or command-specific 
ROE, the commander is still responsible and open to prosecution or disciplinary action [2]. 
This ultimate responsibility leads commanders to want some level of assurance that an 
AWS will perform as expected. 
The issue of needing to trust in the dependability of semi-automated warfighting 
systems is nothing new. The U.S. Navy’s Aegis Combat System supports engage-on-
remote [3], in which the combat system on a ship can be remotely (i.e., not from the host 
ship) commanded by the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to launch against a 
target [4]. Lack of operational transparency and understanding of semi and fully 
2 
autonomous decision-making technology has contributed to a strenuous pushback from 
commanders at all levels against implementing an automated kill chain [5]. 
Militaries in different countries are deploying fully autonomous weapons capable 
of making engagement decisions on their own and controversy surrounds the use of 
artificial intelligence (AI) used for surveillance and decision-making by weapon systems 
[5]. The employment of AI in weapon systems raises concerns not just because of 
perceptions of risk. Such systems are both mission- and safety-critical. From the 
perspective of system safety, these systems control the release of energy that can harm 
people, property, and the environment. 
If the U.S. military decides to direct the development and field completely 
autonomous weapon systems, it will need to perform safety-hazards analysis and determine 
ways to address the hazards and their casual factors in such a way that the systems do not 
pose unacceptable levels of safety risk. Given that the initial steps of developing full 
weapon autonomy are underway, it is imperative that system-safety engineering be 
integrally involved in these developments. 
Determining the safety hazards and safety hazard casual factors of fully 
autonomous weapon systems is a challenging task, such as the lack of transparency of the 
inner workings of AI-based decision-making. This is known as the AI transparency 
paradox [6]. No system is perfect, but there needs to be evidence that a system provides 
the desired level of dependability for particular contexts of use. The body evidence, in the 
form of a safety case, forms the basis upon which system stakeholders can judge for 
themselves whether to trust the claims made about the system’s safety by the developers 
and sustainers of the system. This capstone addresses system safety, not mission 
effectiveness, concerns. 
The way AWS are tested and evaluated in the future will play a pivotal role in AWS 
programs’ success. The current and most applicable Department of Defense (DOD) 
guidance is DOD Directive 3000.9 (Autonomy in Weapon Systems) [7]. This Directive 
states that systems must go through hardware and software verification and validation 
(V&V) before being released for operational use. DOD Directive 3000.9 does not discuss 
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how to assess the growing reliance on AI algorithms and machine learning within an AWS 
operating environment. The DOD needs to balance the operational effectiveness and 
system safety of AWS, meaning there will need to be compromises made in order to attain 
an acceptable level of each. 
AWS are disruptive technology [8], the introduction of which will likely 
significantly alter how the U.S. military operates. Introducing fully autonomous weapon 
systems into the fleet will impact naval warfighting strategy and tactics. As Gillespie notes, 
“the changes take several years or decades to have an impact. A technology must be mature 
with reliable products before it can be trusted in the conflict where many lives depend on 
its correct performance” [8]. The new capabilities and flexibility that will arise with fully 
autonomous weapons may need to be introduced incrementally, with the concurrent 
updating of strategy and tactics. New tactics for an AWS may require the development of 
new software safety assessment capabilities to ensure AWS can be operated safely in 
training, maintenance, and operational modes. 
The U.S. Navy periodically retools its system safety assessment capabilities in 
response to technological innovation. A prominent example of this was the transition to the 
use of software-based no-point, no-fire safety interlocks. Before this transition, the Navy 
used electromechanical interlocks for weapons mounted on surface ships. The U.S. Navy 
had to update its safety engineering practices and tools when using software to implement 
safety requirements [9]. 
The U.S. Navy is now introducing AI into autonomous vessels. The Navy is a 
transition partner for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Sea 
Hunter. The U.S. Navy could one day deploy fully autonomous weapons onto an already 
fully autonomous ship like the Sea Hunter. Best practices for system-safety engineering 
dictate that safety interests be represented from day one of the development and through 
the life cycle of a weapon system, regardless of the level of automation of the weapon 
system [5].  
The motivation for conducting the research documented in this capstone is the 
Navy’s keen interest in possible uses of the Sea Hunter. The scope of this capstone is 
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investigating the applicability of the Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes 
(STAMP) framework [10], the theoretical foundation for the System-Theoretic Process 
Analysis (STPA) method to guide the consideration of safety concerns posed by fully 
autonomous naval weapon systems. 
In this capstone we address the following questions: 
• Guidance: What guidance (e.g., instructions, regulations, procedures) 
already exists with the Department of the Navy for assessing the safety of 
autonomous systems? What specific guidance addresses the safety of 
weaponized autonomous systems? Does the Naval Ordnance Safety and 
Security Activity (NOSSA) have any specific programs to address the 
assessment of AI-based weaponized autonomous systems? How are 
foreign navies assessing the safety of their AI-based weaponized 
autonomous systems? 
• Risks: What are the potential risks involved in operating naval AI-based 
weaponized autonomous systems? Are there general classes of safety-
relevant requirements for AI-based weaponized autonomous systems? Are 
existing technical means (e.g., tools, techniques, methods, procedures, 
processes) for assessing software safety sufficient for assessing the safety 
of software-intensive AI-based weaponized autonomous systems? 
• Gaps: Given the answers to questions regarding guidance and risks, what 
are the capability gaps in assessing the safety of naval AI-based 
weaponized autonomous systems? What human-capital (e.g., workforce 
knowledge or experience) gaps exist? What are some ways to resolve 
those gaps? What are the technical gaps? What are some ways to resolve 
those gaps? 
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A. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research explores ways in which the STAMP/STPA framework can be used 
to perform safety engineering on AWS, with the aim of informing the revision of existing 
policy and procedures to address AWS-related system-safety issues. 
The U.S. military does not currently have any fully autonomous weapons; the 
current inventory contains semi-autonomous weapons supervised by human operators to 
intervene when necessary. A good example of such a system is the U.S. Navy’s Phalanx 
Close-In Weapons System (CIWS). “More than thirty nations already have defensive 
supervised autonomous weapons for situations in which the speed of engagement is too 
fast for humans to respond” [1]. CIWS has an automated fire-control system that uses radar 
data to detect, track, and engage threat objects. A few countries have already developed 
fully autonomous weapon systems. Israel has developed an anti-radiation drone (IAI Harpy 
2) that “can search a wide area for enemy radars and, once it finds one, destroy it without 
asking permission. It’s been sold to a handful of countries, and China has reverse-
engineered its own variant” [1]. Other countries like Russia have begun building armed 
robots and drones for war [5]. With adversary militaries taking the lead in developing fully 
autonomous weapon systems, the U.S. military will likely respond by developing its own 
fully autonomous weapon systems—yet another arms race. 
The software dependency of fully autonomous weapon systems will create 
challenges in protection from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. U.S. military 
weapon systems are already heavily software dependent and network-enabled, but fully 
autonomous weapon systems will be completely software dependent. 
Automation and connectivity are fundamental enablers for DOD’s modern 
military capabilities. However, they make weapon systems more vulnerable 
to cyber-attacks. Although the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and others have warned of cyber risks for decades, until recently, 
DOD did not prioritize weapon systems cybersecurity. The DOD is still 
determining how best to address weapon systems cybersecurity. In 
operational testing, DOD routinely found mission-critical cyber 
vulnerabilities in systems that were under development. Yet, program 
officials GAO met with believed their systems were secure and discounted 
some test results as unrealistic. [11] 
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In addition to security, the DOD and U.S. military must create advanced software safety 
assessment capabilities that will ensure these systems can continue to operate safely when 
under a cyber-attack; this includes issuing and revising policies and guidance on 
cybersecurity considerations as they relate to safety on fully autonomous weapon systems. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
This capstone uses the DARPA Sea Hunter as a case study to determine what needs 
to be added to current U.S. Navy software safety assessment capabilities to address AI’s 
inclusion into fully autonomous weapon systems. Chapter I discusses the significance of 
this research. Chapter II discusses current AWS, current U.S. policy on AWS, U.S. plans 
for complete autonomy, and current international policy on AWS. Chapter III gives an 
overview of Sea Hunter’s autonomous capabilities and discusses future variants. Chapter 
IV discusses generic challenges and vulnerabilities for unmanned medium displacement 
vessels. Chapter V discusses current software safety capabilities and introduces the 
STAMP/STPA method. Chapter VI discusses the gaps in current hazard analysis 
capabilities and suggests that STAMP/STPA could be analyzed for application to Sea 
Hunter and other AWS to mitigate those gaps in current hazard analysis capabilities. 











II. CURRENT AWS PLANS AND POLICY 
Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems shall be designed to 
allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human 
judgement over the use of force. 
—Paul Scharre [1] 
There is interest in equipping fully autonomous weapon systems with AI 
technology, as evidenced by the rapid proliferation of open literature on this subject. 
Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence [5] discusses the current and future AI plans 
for the United States, China, and Russia. As countries begin to adopt and further refine AI 
applications, it will become apparent how militaries will use AI in autonomous weapons. 
Current conversation and documentation discuss the legal and ethical concerns of 
developing fully autonomous weapons. There is little information published on how other 
countries are currently approaching AI inclusion into fully autonomous weapons.  
Military research and development (R&D) planners have an arduous job of making 
predictions and determining where investments should be made for maximum effect. There 
are at least three facets to this, but only the first is likely to be fully in the public domain:  
1. Technology developments that are happening independently of military 
spending; 
2. Developments which can happen with military investment; 
3. Likely developments by potential adversaries [8]. 
Military R&D planners will be expected to work in tandem with policymakers to ensure 
future autonomous systems have doctrine in place for successful operations. The United 
States and other countries are beginning to display high interest in developing fully 
autonomous weapon systems. The U.S. Navy has demonstrated this with its innovation in 
developing unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned surface vessels (USVs), 
such as DARPA’s Sea Hunter [12] and Boeing’s Orca [13]. “Naval analysts believe that it 
might be possible to acquire hundreds of robotic vessels for the cost of one modern 
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destroyer. Large capital ships are bound to be prime targets for enemy forces in any future 
military conflict, while a swarm of robot ships would be more difficult to target and losing 
even a dozen of them may have a lesser effect on the outcome of combat” [14]. 
In addition to China and Russia, several more countries are developing and 
showcasing fully autonomous weapon systems, such as Israel with its IAI Harpy 2 [15] and 
South Korea with its SGR-A1 [16]. Policymakers, in turn, need to identify and weigh the 
potential for unintended behavior and mishaps. Additionally, ethical and legal concerns are 
the primary fear of humans’ diminishing role in the kill chain. Future policy needs to 
prioritize the testing phase, explicitly testing the system’s reaction to uncommon 
commands that result in undesirable behavior. The normal routine of military testing to 
create a system that operates as designed within defined environmental constraints cannot 
be accepted as a satisfactory end goal with AI inclusion [5].  
A. CURRENT U.S. POLICY 
In 2012 the DOD its first public policy on autonomy in weapon systems [7]. DOD 
Directive 3000.09 lays out guidelines for the DOD’s development and use of autonomous 
and semi-autonomous weapon systems. DOD Directive 3000.09 is the first policy 
document written by any country on fully autonomous weapons. However, the directive 
does not address all of the potential moral, legal, and operational problems these systems 
pose. “The directive does not cover autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace systems 
for cyberspace operations; unarmed, unmanned platforms; unguided munitions; munitions 
manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser or wire-guided munitions); mines; and 
unexploded ordnance, nor subject them to its guidelines” [17]. The directive requires that 
all systems be designed to “allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels 
of human judgment over the use of force” [7]. In section (4/c/3) the directive states: 
“Autonomous weapon systems may be used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force, such as 
some forms of electronic attack, against material targets” [7]. The non-lethal application of 
force provides ambiguity. What if non-lethal, non-kinetic force indirectly leads to lethal 
effects? This type of ambiguity in control of lethal force by fully autonomous systems is 
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consistent with the fears of many professionals who that domestic and international law 
should prohibit the development of lethal AWS [5]. 
Under DOD Directive 3000.09, the U.S. military cannot develop fully autonomous 
weapon systems unless a waiver is approved. It states that “autonomous or semi-
autonomous weapons intended to be used in a lethal manner must be approved by two 
secretaries of defense and by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff before formal development 
and again before fielding” [7]. The steep approval chain displays the lack of trust in 
developing these systems. Under this directive, if fully AWS receives an approved waiver, 
many of the testing and training requirements may be waived “in cases of urgent military 
operational need” [7]. The directive does not define the statement “urgent military 
operational need.” There are also many loopholes in the directive, “which may entice 
decision makers to cut corners on testing and evaluation of AWS in order to realize short-
term cost savings or bring the development back on schedule, which could endanger 
civilians or cause undesirable behavior. The Directive does establish testing requirements 
that must be complete before the approval of a waiver” [7]. 
Testing fully AWS with the inclusion of AI will be challenging [11]. Providing 
realistic conditions and simulating adversary tactics to test an AI system’s response to a 
growing operational environment must be considered a prerequisite. Creating a testing 
process to meet legal standards will also be challenging, but it remains an end goal. DOD 
Directive 3000.09 will expire on November 21, 2022, 10 years after it took effect. The U.S. 
Navy is not currently developing any fully AWS, but the Navy has built the Sea Hunter, 
which may be equipped with fully autonomous weapons someday. Pressure to do so is 
mounting given that adversaries are already developing and planning to deploy fully 
autonomous weapon systems. The U.S. Navy needs to upgrade its policy, doctrine, and 
test-and-evaluation practices to ensure AWS successfully make decisions in place of 
humans and evolve to handle untested conditions while not violating the laws of armed 
conflict. 
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B. U.S. PLANS FOR COMPLETE AUTONOMY 
“The Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (FY2011–2036) discusses the visions 
of all the individual services in pursing technologies and policies that introduce a higher degree 
of autonomy to reduce the manpower burden” [18]. This plan for autonomy covers 
developments in ground, air, and underwater systems. The U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, and 
Marine Corps all have visions to develop and deploy fully autonomous weapons in the future, 
yet all lack policy guidelines to ensure dependable and secure operation. Avizienis et al. treat 
the term “dependability” to include the following attributes: availability, reliability, safety, 
integrity, and maintainability [19]. Creating additional measures beyond V&V will be an 
inescapable prerequisite to ensure fully autonomous systems’ dependable and secure operation. 
“To ensure the safety and reliability of autonomous systems and to fully realize the benefits of 
these systems, new approaches to V&V are required” [18]. 
The goals for complete autonomy in military systems are ambitious, but it remains to 
be seen just how valuable the acquisition community and commanders in the field will find 
them once they are demonstrated [5]. If military applications of AI in the near and distant future 
progress greatly in target recognition and decision making, complete autonomy will be 
expected to be utilized as a trustworthy warfighting capability. 
C. INTERNATIONAL DISCUSSION 
The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) holds annual meetings to 
discuss legal, ethical, technological, and military standpoints of lethal autonomous weapons 
systems (AWS-L). In recent years, the Group of Government Experts leading the meetings has 
not produced any specific AWS-L policy recommendations. The sessions have always 
concluded with the majority vote that human operators must maintain engagement decisions 
over AWS-L and that AWS-L are subject to (IHL) [20]. One reason for the lack of progress by 
the U.N.’s GGE in producing policy guidance is the challenge of coming to agreement on what 
are the attributes of AWS-L. “Some members of the GGE perceive AWS-L as full autonomy 
with no manual human control, while other experts view it as still having the option for human 
control if necessary. The U.S., China, and Russia continue to be the most influential actors and 
will likely decide if militaries will normalize AWS-L in the future” [20]. 
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III. SEA HUNTER OVERVIEW 
They may carry weapons one day, that’s a choice the Navy will have to 
make, their value is out there and being widely distributed in large numbers, 
they have to go off by themselves and in harsh, unpredicted environments, 
they have to sense and make decisions. 
—Rear Adm. Nevin Carr [21] 
A. CAPABILITIES 
The Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) initiated the Sea 
Hunter program in 2010 to create an autonomous submarine tracking ship. As the Anti-
Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) progressed over the 
years, Navy leadership took over the project development as a transition partner. The Sea 
Hunter has a 132 ft length, 16 ft draft, and a displacement of 145 tons and operates 
continuously, with up to a 10000 mile range, using sonar and other sensors to locate mines 
and enemy submarines. It has a high-frequency sonar that sends acoustic pings determining 
the characteristics of potential underwater adversaries to track enemy submarines over a 
long duration. As technology has evolved in recent years, the Navy changed the Sea 
Hunter’s operational scope from teleoperation to increasingly greater levels of autonomy, 
performing a wide range of functions without requiring human intervention [22]. The Navy 
integrated Sea Hunter 1 into a carrier strike group leading a large U.S. Pacific Fleet 
experiment in the summer of 2020 [23]. Results of the work are unpublished as of the 
publication date of this report. Sea Hunter II will incorporate lessons learned from Sea 
Hunter 1 and was scheduled to begin at-sea testing at the end of 2020. 
Sea Hunter 1 is the first ship in naval history to set sail and arrive in a distant port 
without human interaction or oversight. The ship sailed more than 5,200 miles from San 
Diego, California to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and back without a crew’s need for navigation 
and steering. “It demonstrates to the U.S. Navy that autonomy technology is ready to move 
from the developmental and experimental stages to advanced mission testing” [24]. Sea 
Hunter operates using a Remote Supervisory Control Station (RSCS). The RSCS provides 
autonomous, independent operations under limited remote human supervision. In Figure 1 
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[25], the major elements of the Sea Hunter’s autonomy architecture that support 
autonomous operation are illustrated. The autonomy architecture consists of a high-level 
mission planner, health monitor, sensor manager, world model situational awareness 
component, and intelligent decision support component [25].  
Figure 1. Sea Hunter Autonomy Architecture. Source: [25] 
These ship’s control systems need to perform well under unpredictable environmental 
conditions for extended periods. Additionally, systems must compensate without external 
intervention for dependability and security issues that arise, that is, for times when the ship 
is in a degraded mode of operation. 
B. FUTURE VARIANTS
The success displayed by the prototype Sea Hunter has resulted in the funding for
future variants. According to [26], 
The U.S. Navy awarded L3 Technologies a contract to develop a prototype 
medium unmanned surface vehicle (MUSV). L3 served as a subcontractor 
for Leidos, the lead contractor for the Sea Hunter program. L3 plans to 
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deliver the first MUSV prototype by the end of FY2023. DARPA contracted 
for two Sea Hunter vessels in what was originally the ACTUV program but 
has since shifted its focus to be the predecessor to MUSV. A Pentagon 
office also contracted for two Large USVs as part of the Overlord program, 
and the Navy will also take those vessels and use them to shape a large 
unmanned surface vehicle (LUSV) program of its own. The U.S. Navy 
envisions a family of unmanned systems that will be the backbone of a 
future fleet of netted “attritable” platforms that will provide lower-cost 
options compared to manned surface combatants like the Arleigh Burke-
class destroyer or the new FFG(X) frigate program. The MUSV and the 
existing Sea Hunter vessel have different missions and requirements. The 
existing Sea Hunter vessel was designed and built with the mission of ASW 
and would be capable of tracking and following submarines using a hull-
mounted sonar array over long distances. The MUSV will provide and 
improve distributed situational awareness in maritime areas of 
responsibility through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and 
electronic warfare implemented by modular payloads. 
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IV. GENERIC MUSV CHALLENGES AND VULNERABILITIES 
While the following listed challenges and vulnerabilities are not Sea Hunter 
specific examples, Sea Hunter’s design and implementation must directly deal with these 
issues. Military Autonomous Weapon Systems are designed to operate within a secure 
digital perimeter. The resources guarded against outside entities will be strictly “controlled 
by an outer firewall to prevent unauthorized access” [27].  AWS will complete complex 
operations and “carry sensitive data, so there is a need to ensure that only authorized” 
systems and personnel can access these systems [27]. Performing autonomous missions 
make “it necessary to access and transfer data; the objective of preventing outside 
individuals from conducting cyber-attacks is achieved by defining and enforcing 
appropriate access control policies” [27].  Threats to confidentiality in data can be internal 
or external. By enforcing access control using the Bell LaPadula (BLP) security model, a 
state machine model used for implementing access control in government and military 
applications, confidentiality threats by internal threats can be mitigated effectively. Strict 
implementation of the BLP model “does not allow a user to modify its security label; this 
ensures that the system never arrives in a state where higher-level information becomes 
accessible to lower-level users through side channels” [27].  This statement is controversial 
through as other security experts claim, “covert channels and side channels can occur 
despite implementation of the BLP model” [28]. Confidentiality of an AWS could also be 
compromised “by capturing data over network links” [27].  AWS data travels wirelessly 
and over broad geographical areas, making it simple for cyber-attackers to capture data 
with sniffers [27]. The data captured with sniffers could consist of “control commands 
(uplink) and sensor/surveillance data (downlink)” [27].  To date, AWS data that has been 
compromised was typically a result of weak or non-existent data encryption techniques 
[27]. 
Protecting the integrity of AWS from threats depends on the “authenticity of the 
received data” [27].  Two leading “causes of integrity compromises in AWS could be 
modified or corrupted data by the hacker before it arrives at the receiver, a man-in-the-
middle-attack (MITM)” [27].  The attacker assumes the sender’s identity and successfully 
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sends fake data that appears to be sent from the real sender to the system. Suppose the 
integrity of a system is not protected. In that case, it can have severe consequences because 
corrupted data makes incorrect decisions on the system, and the AI mechanisms may not 
distinguish a corrupt command from intended commands. For example, if a hacker 
“launches a MITM attack on the Command and Control (C2) data sent to an AWS,” it can 
take control of all functionality [27]. Similarly, if a hacker “modifies the sensor/
surveillance data on a downlink transmission on an AWS supporting a military mission, 
the effects could be catastrophic” [27].  This is not an abstract fear, Iranian forces took 
control of and landed a U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle that was conducting surveillance 
operations near the border [30]. It was reported that some of the communications between 
the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and ground controllers were unencrypted, which 
channels were unspecified. This illustrates very directly that an effective, full and 
comprehensive risk assessment had not been conducted with respect to an active adversary 
for a real-world deployed UAV system. Similar results are not acceptable for larger and 
more expensive AWS. What may seem elementary to cybersecurity experts may not be 
elementary to non-cyber trained systems designers. 
An AWS availability can be compromised by hackers gaining unauthorized access 
and “preventing authorized entities from on-demand and timely access to data and system 
services” [27].  Future AWS will “utilize autonomously computed commands and cyber 
services for real-time control of motion, onboard engines, and weapon system suites” [27].  
An information warrior’s or hacker’s objective could be any of the following: to crash 
software components; “prevent timely delivery to remote commands sent over wireless or 
satellite links to AWS; or prevent the timely delivery of surveillance/reconnaissance data 
collected by the AWS” [27].  The leading cybersecurity concerns that can compromise an 
AWS availability are jamming data communication links, DDoS (Distributed Denial-of-
Service) attacks, and injecting malware (viruses, worms, and trojans) into onboard systems 
[27]. 
As technology continues to progress, so do our adversaries’ strategies and tactics 
for conducting operations in cyberspace. Analyzing risk within a system in terms of input 
and output data can also be challenging. Howard and LeBlanc state that “All Input is Evil,” 
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emphasizing “the point that every input received by a component from the outside can pose 
a threat to the system” [29] Additionally, in dealing with AWS, any output sent over a 
wireless transmission poses a threat. The data transmitted wirelessly can be observed by 
adversaries and is subject to malicious modifications before reaching its destination. 
Unmanned systems “are being designed with insufficient attention to cybersecurity 
concerns” [27].  If AWS future is to be secure, we must “provide robust security for 
protecting data and cyber systems from sophisticated threats” [27].  
The emerging fields of AI and Machine Learning (ML) have gained momentum, 
and the future of military applications in these fields will depend on civilian technology’s 
success and must be wary of its failures. For example, in February 2019 an innocent man 
was arrested based on facial recognition software [31]. The software made the wrong 
decision. Each AWS will operate in complex and dynamic environments and will need to 
react dependably and securely based on an accurate perception of its surroundings. Each 
AWS will have multiple sensors employed to make proper decisions with the growing 
nature of its operating environment. When AWS are fully integrated into the military, it 
will require that different aspects of systems have a benchmark and proper metrics 
designated for each component that makes decisions in a human operator’s place. The 
reference point will set a standard and a baseline for developing the specific systems to 
help recognize scenarios. For example, if an AWS transits through U.S. waters, it may or 
may not be scanning for an adversary and it should never mistake civilian crafts or 
infrastructure for the enemy. This baseline of autonomy will be challenging to maintain 
with the growing nature of AI and ML.  
A kill-chain refers to the sequence of events required to achieve a warfighting 
effect. In a kill-chain, there are multiple related steps for achieving the desired outcome. 
The kill-chain does not have a clear doctrinal definition, but it contains a combination of 
find, fix, and finish across all warfare areas [32].  
The prospect of implementing full autonomy into a kill-chain could have a 
disastrous effect by making the wrong decision, such as noncombatants being injured, 
killed, or U.S. infrastructure destroyed [32]. This differs from human mistakes, for 
example, these systems will not have the ability to make ethical decisions, those potential 
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mistakes create fear among commanders. The decisions these systems make will be limited 
to the scenarios used to train its sensors [32]. Human operators occasionally make mistakes 
when making targeting decisions; those mistakes are unacceptable. Regardless of whether 
a military officer relies on technology to decide and take action, he or she is held 
accountable. He or she is also responsible for the effects of automated processes, such as 
those used by autonomous weapons systems. After the Persian Gulf War, Operation 
Provide Comfort (OPC) was created as a multinational humanitarian effort to relieve the 
suffering of hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees who had fled into the hills of 
northern Iraq during the war [10]. On patrol supporting OPC, two United States Air Force 
F-15 Eagle fighters mistakenly shot down two United States Army Black Hawk helicopters 
that were also participating in OPC and were carrying twenty-six allied personnel [10]. All 
personnel were killed during the incident. Miscommunication and misunderstanding of the 
environment were the major factors that led to the improper targeting and shootdown of 
the helicopters. Human operators still make mistakes while following their command-
enforced kill-chain procedures in complex dynamic environments. What guarantees are 
there that machines are able to operate more accurately as a replacement in those complex 
dynamic environments? In the future, any lethal-capable AWS will have to execute ROE 
in parallel with kill-chain responsibilities correctly. Under current kill chains, autonomy is 
generally employed to replicate items in the kill chain exactly as they are carried out by 
manned systems [32]. Advances in autonomy have been steady, but the transition to 
systems capable of reacting to unexpected changes in the environment has not occurred 
and might not occur for several years [32]. 
The DOD’s “AI strategy directs the DOD to accelerate the adoption of AI and the 
creation of a force fit for our time” [33]. The future outcomes of war will depend on our 
ability to use AI to maintain technological and operational superiority over our adversaries. 
Our pacing competitors are Russia and China, both countries are developing advanced 
capabilities “such as jamming U.S. military networks and disrupting GPS satellites,” [34] 
and are beginning to achieve these objectives through fully AWS [34]. Simultaneously, the 
U.S. military has dealt with national and international policy regarding whether weapon 
systems should operate autonomously and be allowed to use lethal force with no human 
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oversight. The U.S. military will face several “potential challenges in its future efforts to 
implement autonomy and AI into military capabilities as an effective deterrent” [34]: 
• A near-peer threat gains military edge over the U.S. by being faster to 
field military capabilities incorporating state-of-the art commercial 
technology with autonomy or AI. 
• The U.S. limits its use of autonomy after interoperability challenges, a 
particular vulnerability in autonomous weapon systems make autonomous 
systems less effective than legacy capabilities. 
• The U.S. limits its use of lethal autonomy after recurring problems with 
fratricide, civilian casualties, or other inadvertent engagements. 
• The U.S. finds itself lacking freedom of action to use autonomy because: 
• U.S. military operators don’t trust and refuse to use autonomous 
systems, or commanders and political leaders are unwilling to 
accept the risk. 
• Lethal autonomous weapon systems are preemptively banned by 
international convention. 
• Our allies refuse to participate in a coalition or provide intelligence 
to the U.S. if it uses autonomous weapon platforms in military 
operations [34].  
All of these challenges are avoidable, but these concerns have significant consequences if 
not addressed appropriately. These cut both ways, if sufficient trust cannot be achieved in 
these systems, they may not be deployed in situations where they can reduce casualties or 
damage; likewise, if trusted in an unfounded manner, the system may make undesirable 
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V. EXPLORATION OF CURRENT SOFTWARE SAFETY 
CAPABILITIES 
By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail. 
—Benjamin Franklin 
The U.S. Navy needs the ability to adequately assess the dependability of their fully 
autonomously weapons. Otherwise, there is no basis upon which to manage risk or place 
trust in the dependable operation of these systems. Here we use the terms dependability 
and trust as defined in [19]:   
The original definition of dependability is the ability to deliver service that 
can justifiably be trusted. This definition stresses the need for justification 
of trust. The alternate definition that provides the criterion for deciding if 
the service is dependable is the dependability of a system is the ability to 
avoid service failures that are more frequent and more severe than is 
acceptable. 
It is usual to say that the dependability of a system should suffice for the 
dependence being placed on that system. The dependence of system A on 
system B, thus, represents the extent to which system A’s dependability is 
(or would be) affected by that of System B. The concept of dependence 
leads to that of trust, which can very conveniently be defined as accepted 
dependence. 
Modern munitions are becoming increasingly networked allowing them to be 
redirected after initial launch. Traditionally, networked munitions are monitored and 
retargeted by human oversight. The use of AI will enable the U.S. Navy to transition from 
relying on human judgement to permit machine intelligence to make decisions about the 
release and guidance of weapons. “Autonomous systems are complex, and some of the 
most advanced elements, such as Deep Learning elements, are effectively black boxes” 
[35]. Their learned algorithms are difficult to uncover, thus making it challenging to 
perform effective validation, verification, and accreditation (VV&A) [35]. 
Inadequate VV&A puts Naval personnel in a difficult situation. They need to use 
the systems they are presented with:  They do not have evidence regarding the 
dependability upon which to objectively decide how much trust to place in the systems. A 
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commander’s ability to trust autonomous systems in their operating environment will be 
vital to mission success, in addition to mitigating the risks associated with safety and 
operational hazards. “VV&A is ultimately about mitigating risk. The question is: Can I 
trust this system to work as planned?” [35] The results of conducting traditional scenario-
based testing fails to provide acquisition professionals and operators with sufficient 
evidence about the dependability attributes of a system. According to Alves [36], 
The context in which autonomous systems will operate makes it hard to 
even determine the adequacy of test cases. Further, the complexity of the 
program logic, which is caused by characteristics that are inherent in 
autonomous systems such as assembling their own course of actions for a 
given goal, adapting to different environments, learning, diagnosing 
themselves and reconfiguring themselves to maintain their functionality 
makes it methodologically and conceptually challenging to assess the 
coverage of testing on such systems. In fact, a major concern on testing 
autonomous systems is that the methods are built on the assumption that if 
a system passes all tests then it will work flawlessly during operation. 
However, since the behavior of autonomous systems can change over time, 
it casts doubts on reliability of test results. 
Dependability of fully autonomous systems is of paramount importance for many 
reasons. The systems could be tasked to conduct lengthy missions with only intermittent 
communications with external command and control systems. Thus, these systems will 
need to be self-sufficient, performing self-diagnosis of their health and readiness for 
operation in combat, training, and maintenance modes. In addition to self-diagnosis, any 
issues encountered will need to be resolved by the autonomous system itself, such as 
repairs, navigation around obstacles, and even operating safely in degraded modes of 
operation (e.g., broken bilge pump, inoperable missile hatch, malfunctioning sensors and 
embedded systems). The bottom line is that any fully autonomous systems to be used by 
the U.S. Navy will be highly reliant on AI-enabled decision-making in an unpredictably 
dynamic internal and external environment for which it is impossible to exhaustively test 
all possible environmental conditions and permutations. 
The behavior of the system needs to be such that safety and operational hazards, in 
conjunction with system failures and environmental conditions, pose an acceptable level 
of risk. Operational hazards are defined as mishaps or losses, inflicted by outside systems, 
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particularly hostile forces. System hazards are defined as those conditions that can result 
in mishaps or losses by actions of the system. “Trust in the autonomy is critical, particularly 
the software’s ability to handle unanticipated failures” [37]. System safety risk needs to be 
considered in terms of safety hazards, which in turn need to be evaluated in terms of 
severity of outcome and probability of occurrence. Operational hazards are outside the 
scope of this capstone, although the information provided in the rest of this chapter is just 
as applicable for assessing operational hazards as it is for assessing system safety hazards. 
A. AUTONOMY VALIDATION, INTROSPECTION, AND ASSESSMENT 
(AVIA) 
AVIA is a modeling and simulation tool developed for rapidly testing and 
evaluating the logic of fully autonomous systems. AVIA is used to conduct analytic 
assessments of the behavior of the Sea Hunter’s AI system under scenarios in which the 
state of the operational environment changes. According to [38], 
AVIA’s initial objective was to execute a thousand one-hour real-time 
scenarios in less than 24 hours. One thousand hours of operations is 
equivalent to 42 days at sea. To reduce 42 days of assessment time to occur 
in less than 24 hours shows the power of AVIA. This initial objective was 
achieved in the first year of the program. Subsequent years incorporated 
improved scenario fidelity, increased metrics for assessing the perception 
of behavioral logic, and automated approaches to assessing an issue and 
spinning out additional scenario runs to execute in parallel to the initial 
1,000 runs. 
AVIA is designed to generate randomized conditions and obstacles, then introduce 
unexpected events to stress the system. “It can access the actual autonomy logic at several 
different tap points, so if there’s a problem, it can be distinguished from the sensors, the 
perception, or the behavior response” [38]. AVIA uses the Latin Hypercube Sampling 
strategy to generate a statistically relevant set of conditions during the testing phase and 
helps provide confidence that sufficient testing has been conducted to adequately explore 
the operating space with a near-minimum number of test cases. The safety assessment, 
along with V&V, needs to focus on the high-severity, high-probability system hazards, and 
additionally consider the other safety hazards as available resources permit. Identifying 
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hazards begins with the identification of possible mishaps and working backwards towards 
potential system attributes, functions, and features that can cause or contribute to mishaps. 
AVIA was utilized to test the navigation logic of Sea Hunter and how accurately it 
followed the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGSs). 
During Sea Hunter’s initial at-sea COLREG testing the vessel exhibited speed and course 
change indecision. The COLREG testing results were used to make improvements to Sea 
Hunter’s path planner, which “utilizes mission objectives, nautical charts, and sensor data 
to find the best course to safely reach the vessel’s destination” [39]. After the updates to 
Sea Hunter’s path planner, Sea Hunter’s ability to accurately follow COLREGs improved 
significantly. This high proficiency in COLREGS provided the U.S. Navy stakeholders 
enough evidence for them to place trust in the claims about the dependability of the system, 
and further, to deploy Sea Hunter from San Diego to Pearl Harbor and back without human 
intervention [38]. 
B. SYSTEMS-THEORETIC ACCIDENT MODEL AND PROCESSES 
(STAMP) 
Leveson introduces Systems-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) 
in Engineering a Safer World: System Thinking Applied to Safety [10]. The underlying 
tenant of STAMP is that “accidents occur when external disturbances, component failures, 
or dysfunctional interactions among system components are not adequately handled by the 
control system, that is, they result from inadequate control or enforcement of safety-related 
constraints on the development, design, and operation of the system” [40]. The goal of 
STAMP is to prevent future accidents. To achieve this goal, decision-makers and system 
safety engineers think in terms of “designing and implementing controls that will enforce 
the adequate safety constraints” [10].  Creating adequate safety constraints and controls 
that accurately react to those constraints is challenging. STAMP’s focus is on “identifying 
the constraints required to maintain safety; identifying the flaws in the control structure 
that can lead to an accident (inadequate enforcement of the safety constraints); and then 
designing a control structure, physical system and operating conditions,” all of which 
enforce the safety constraints [10].  
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The STAMP causality model is based on system theory and provides the theoretical 
foundation for System-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA). A system is defined as a set of 
system components that act together as a whole to achieve some common goal, objective 
or end [41]. A system may be part of a larger system or be divided into subsystems. Figure 
2 [41], illustrates a typical hierarchy for the system labeled A. The three subsystems (A1, 
A2, A3) are viewed as systems themselves. 
 
Figure 2. Typical Hierarchy of a System. Source [41]. 
The advantages of using STAMP are: 
• It works on complex systems because it works top-down rather than 
bottom up [41]. 
• It includes software, human factors, organizations, safety culture, and 
casual factors in accidents and other types of losses without having to treat 
them differently or separately [41]. 
• It serves as the foundation for tools such as STPA [41]. 
“In STAMP, systems are viewed as interrelated components kept in a state of 
dynamic equilibrium by feedback control loops; systems are not treated as static but as 
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dynamic processes that are continually adapting to achieve their ends and to react to 
changes in themselves and their environment” [10].  Under the STAMP causality model, 
when a mishap happens, one or more of the following must have occurred: 
1. The safety constraints were not enforced by the controller [10]. 
• The control actions necessary to enforce the associated safety 
constraint at each level of the sociotechnical control structure for 
the system were not provided. 
• The necessary control actions were provided but at the wrong time 
(too early or too late) or stopped too soon. 
• Unsafe control actions were provided that caused a violation of the 
safety constraints. 
2. Appropriate control actions were provided but not followed [10]. 
This causality model is applied differently from one level of the sociotechnical control 
structure to another. “Each component of the sociotechnical system may have different 
aspects of an accident under its control and is responsible for different parts of the accident 
process, that is, different hazards and safety constraints” [10].  
C. SYSTEM-THEORETIC PROCESS ANALYSIS (STPA) 
Hazard analysis techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) [42] were created to analyze primarily electro-mechanical 
systems and identify potential losses due to component failure. Current software-intensive 
designs require more powerful analysis approaches that go beyond component failure to 
identify additional causes of mishaps [5]. 
STPA is a hazard analysis technique based on STAMP. STPA analyzes component 
failures and assumes that accidents can also be caused by unsafe interactions of system 
components, none of which may have failed [41]. Advantages that STPA provides over 
traditional hazard analysis techniques include: 
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• Complex systems can be analyzed. “Unknown unknowns” that were 
previously only found in operations can be identified early in the 
development process and either eliminated or mitigated [41].  
• Unlike the conventional hazard analysis methods, STPA can be used in 
early concept analysis to assist in identifying safety requirements and 
constraints, which in turn can then be used to design safety and security 
into the system architecture and design, eliminating the costly rework 
involved when flaws in requirements, architecture, or design are identified 
late in system development or during sustainment and operations. As the 
system is refined into more detail, the STPA analysis is also refined to 
inform decisions about detailed design. Complete traceability from 
requirements to all system artifacts can be easily maintained enhancing 
system maintainability and evolution [41]. 
• STPA includes software and human operators in the analysis, ensuring 
that the hazard analysis includes all potential causal factors in losses [41]. 
• STPA provides documentation of system functionality that is often 
missing or difficult to find in large, complex systems [41].  
• STPA can be easily integrated into a system engineering process and into 
model-based system engineering [41]. 
Comparisons between STPA and traditional hazard analysis methods, such as FTA 
and FMEA, have been completed on complex systems. In the study titled: Hazard Analysis 
of Complex Spacecraft Using STPA [42], a comparison between the STPA and traditional 
methods found that STPA identified all scenarios identified by the traditional methods and 
also identified additional problematic scenarios [42]. In [42], a hazard analysis of the Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency H-II Transfer Vehicle “KOUNTORI” (HTV) (JAXA 
HTV) was conducted comparing STPA to traditional hazard analysis methods. The JAXA 
HTV is an unmanned cargo transfer spacecraft that is launched from the Tanegashima 
Space Center and delivers supplies to the International Space Station (ISS). This analysis 
28 
was conducted by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to identify 
hazards in approaching, berthing, and departure of the JAXA HTV to the ISS. The results 
of the analysis stated that “all casual factors identified by FTA were found by STPA, and 
STPA identified additional casual factors that had not been identified by FTA” [42]. 
STPA provides a modern hazard analysis technique to address the concerns of new 
complex technology such as the Sea Hunter. Software system safety is still a relatively new 
safety-engineering discipline, with its body of knowledge and practices evolving rapidly. 
The software system safety processes being developed are important because software 
plays a major role in modern weapon systems. For example, software controls of the 
launching, fuzing, navigation, and guidance of many types of missiles; if there is a design 
flaw or run-time error, in combination with other physical hazards incorrectly enabling the 
ability to perform a launch, a mishap might result. Implementing STPA design 
methodologies into a software-intensive system like the Sea Hunter might prove beneficial 
because no software program is completely error free; nor is it possible to prove that 
complex software systems are completely error-free. Characterization of software behavior 
is limited to the operational environment in which it is tested. It is impossible to test every 
scenario and environment the system software will encounter over its life cycle through 
inputs from sensors and actuators. Designing with STPA may provide insights into 
potential hazards early in the design process for future Sea Hunter variants. Additionally, 
STPA has the potential to greatly improve the process of V&V, ensuring the system is 
designed to the stakeholder’s requirements. 
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VI. DISCUSSION OF GAPS IN CURRENT CAPABILITIES 
There is a widening gap between ambitions and achievements in software 
engineering. This gap appears in several dimensions: between promises to 
users and performance achieved by software, between what seems to be 
ultimately possible and what is achievable now and between estimates of 
software costs and expenditures. 
—Dr. Edward E. David Jr. and Dr. Alexander G. Fraser 
A. TESTING AND EVALUATION 
To ensure the U.S. Navy keeps its competitive edge over its adversaries, the U.S. 
is rapidly developing advanced systems, but at the same time ensuring that those systems 
are dependable and effective. Moving systems and technologies forward through the 
acquisition process requires conducting sufficient test and evaluation (T&E) to ensure that 
they can perform their missions in real-world operations [43]. There are concerns about the 
investment in T&E infrastructure, in July 2017 the U.S. Committee on Appropriations in 
[43] stated: 
The Committee is concerned that these investments are not being matched 
by coordinated funding of modern research and testing infrastructure that 
will ensure that these new systems and technologies are developed and 
tested as efficiently and quickly as possible and are deployed to operational 
forces as soon as feasible. The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense 
to develop a plan for investments in research and testing infrastructure, 
including through major military construction projects that support 
development of Third Offset capabilities. The strategy should make clear 
how the infrastructure investments will be timed so that they are coordinated 
with planned programs of record. 
Third Offset capabilities are defined as U.S. military advantages based on advanced 
technologies such as AI combined with new operational concepts [43]. Emerging fully 
autonomous systems will create new challenges for T&E and will require new T&E 
infrastructure. Fully autonomous systems, like many other systems used with the DOD 
enterprise, will require regular software upgrades to enhance their capabilities and 
continuously improve their dependability.  
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T&E of autonomous systems needs to involve less-scripted, segmented 
scenarios to ascertain how well systems perform under specific conditions 
and rather a broader exploration of how systems perceive and interact with 
their environments. Autonomous systems will also need to be tested 
iteratively throughout their life cycles, to reflect software updates and 
machine learning; a linear set of tests prior to acquisition will not be enough. 
[43]  
The T&E process “will need to be more variable and agile, with the T&E community 
involved at both earlier and later stages of the life cycle, including system development. 
The extent of repeatability that is typically sought in T&E of new systems may not be 
attainable for autonomous systems” [43]. 
The gap between a developer’s ambition and the actual dependability and 
performance achieved through software is one of the greatest challenges to developing 
fully autonomous systems because testing a particular set of behaviors does not provide 
complete trust across all possible behaviors or address potential emergent behaviors. The 
DOD and military require new T&E infrastructure to conduct extensive testing early in the 
development stage and periodically throughout the system’s life cycle. Identifying and 
applying the intent of the intellectual property owner is an important step to implementing 
safe and reliable software into these systems. Additionally, testing the system to safeguard 
its software from adversary theft by any means is a necessary prerequisite. The DOD and 
Navy’s acceptability criteria for software that shapes the behavior of autonomous systems 
need to be addressed. The following questions address acceptable criteria for software [8]:  
1. Algorithms 
• Who owns their intellectual property? 
• Does the algorithm have a known mathematical basis? 
• Is the mathematical basis known to the weapon system designer? 
• What are the assumptions in the mathematical expression of the 
algorithms? 
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• Can the algorithms be modelled so that the software 
implementation can be verified? [8] 
2. Software 
• Is the software safety or mission critical? 
• Is the software sustainable as architected and designed? 
• Who owns the intellectual property? 
• Will the software or data be highly classified? If so, will there need 
to be a self-destruct mechanism on any processor or database in a 
projectile that may fall into hostile hands? 
• Has the supplier developed and written the software themselves? 
• Is the software under configuration control by the supplier(s)? 
• How robust is the software to operating system upgrades? 
• What documentation will be supplied with the software? 
• Will the customer have access to the code? [8] 
An overhaul of military T&E infrastructure would not only require a new vigorous testing 
process, but it would also require a change in philosophy. A shift in philosophy from 
identifying software failures during their life cycle to identifying potential software failures 
during the development stage is necessary for the development of fully autonomous 
weapon systems. With the end goal for these systems to operate fully autonomously with 
no human oversight, they must endure a rigorous process of T&E and provide positive 
results ensuring they are trustworthy to commanders. In addition to creating a T&E process 
that prioritizes safety over basic acceptable operation, software documentation standards 
need to be addressed. 
Software documentation tends to be inadequate and often times non-existent [8]. 
Software documentation provides a description of how the system operates and how the 
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interconnected subsystems are linked together [44]. During maintenance and software 
upgrade installations, having good software documentation provides developers and users 
the tools to seamlessly navigate the system [44]. Unfortunately, in most cases, the U.S. 
military lacks adequate software documentation to assist in troubleshooting. Typically, if 
software documentation is lacking for a system or difficult to comprehend, the developer 
is contacted directly, resulting in delayed maintenance and troubleshooting efforts. “To 
address these issues (at least partially), different approaches and tools have been proposed 
to aid developers during software documentation, including automatic generation of code 
and manuals” [44]. From a system-safety engineering perspective, all aspects of 
development and sustainment need to be documented and tracked, from system conception 
to retirement and disposal of the system.  
Implementing the STAMP/STPA hazard analysis technique into the current T&E 
problem can enhance the U.S. Navy’s ability to assess the dependability of software system 
safety capabilities. Applying STAMP/STPA to AI-based autonomous systems could 
provide the Navy’s integrated project teams with the information needed about the safety 
hazards across the entire hierarchy of control systems—information needed to properly 
assess safety risk and informing the refinement of safety requirements and controls. The 
next section details this. 
B. STAMP/STPA USAGE FOR AWS 
As introduced in Chapter 5, the STAMP/STPA process is an approach that could 
be used to prioritize system safety engineering design for a fully autonomous ship such as 
the Sea Hunter. STAMP/STPA is centered on assessing the system safety engineering 
based on a functional hierarchy. Figure 3 [45] illustrates a functional hierarchy of high-
level operations for the Sea Hunter; this hierarchy was created in an analysis of the Sea 
Hunter and its potential contribution to distributed lethality as a Surface Warfare platform 
[45]. Figure 3 illustrates the functional hierarchy of the potentially lethal Sea Hunter design 
evolution and we can use that as a starting point for determining where to apply STAMP/
STPA, thus helping the system safety engineering team explore the impact of the different 
layered system controls on the safe operation of the Sea Hunter. Note that autonomy used 
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in this sense means that the Sea Hunter can perform its tasks without human intervention. 
It does not mean that there is no human-machine teaming. Specifically, a human operator 
may remotely take control of Sea Hunter if necessary. Further, fully autonomous operation 
of the Sea Hunter may be the exception rather than the norm. The level of autonomy will 
likely depend on the context of operation and mode of operation (e.g., in combat with 
degraded or inoperable communications with its tactical controller. 
 
Figure 3. Functional Hierarchy for Sea Hunter. Source: [45]. 
a. Functional hierarchy of high-level potential safety hazards 
This section describes a few of the potential safety hazards that can arise with the 
associated Sea Hunter operations described in Figure 3. It is important to distinguish the 
difference between safety and operational hazards, as they are often confused. As 
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previously defined, safety hazards are those conditions that can result in mishaps or losses 
by actions of the system. 
• Determine Organic Maritime Picture: The system must accurately 
identify, track, and understand the difference between friendly and hostile 
vessels. Misinterpretation of the maritime picture could result in collision 
or unintended weapons release [45]. 
• Utilize Surface Search Radar: If the system has a loss of its surface search 
radar, will it still be able to acquire an accurate maritime picture? Manned 
vessels can utilize eyesight in the case of this event, but autonomous 
systems only see through their sensors. Potential safety hazards include 
collisions with other vessels [45]. 
• Utilize Electro-Optic Sensors: The loss of electro-optic sensors would be 
comparable to the loss of the surface search radar because it serves as a 
backup. If the system is operating in extreme weather, it may not be able 
to maintain an accurate maritime picture [45]. 
• Utilize TALONS: The TALON capability extends the range of the surface 
search radar and the electro-optic sensor by way of an airborne towed 
payload. Potential safety hazards include the payload crashing into the 
ocean or potentially the Sea Hunter with no human response team 
available to respond to the casualty [45]. 
• Establish Comms/Data Link: The Sea Hunter’s ability to share data with 
its tactical superior will be crucial if they carry weapons. Under tactical 
control Sea Hunter will likely share track data with nearby ships to 
increase the tactical picture. Without a steady comms/data link, time-
critical firing solutions and weapons release decisions could be lost. This 
could result in firing a weapon when the vessel should have followed a 
hold-fire command that arrived or was processed too late [45]. 
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• Receive Human Supervisor Input/Commands: Potential safety hazard 
casual factors related to receiving human supervisor input/commands 
include incorrectly processing a command. For example, receiving a 
command to target an incoming threat, but no response from the system 
[45]. 
• Maneuver Tactically: Human operators have the additional advantage of 
eyesight when maneuvering tactically to engage or evade an adversary. 
Complete reliance on sensors to maneuver tactically could result in a 
collision or the inability to maneuver because the system is not 
comprehending the contact picture or not comprehending it fast enough. 
Maneuvering tactically happens at high speeds and the radar picture may 
be slightly delayed. That slight delay can make the difference in accurately 
avoiding contacts in a congested area [45]. 
• Proceed to Optimal Firing Range & Bearing: Potential safety hazards that 
may arise with proceeding to optimal firing range & bearing could be the 
system fails to produce multiple bearing and range solutions and proceeds 
to the single solution that is in the same location as a fixed maritime object 
(hazard of collision) or is in the vicinity of fishing vessels (hazard of 
injuring civilians) [45]. 
• Launch ASCMs (Anti-ship cruise missile): The launching of ASCMS may 
one day be a fully autonomous capability. Potential safety hazards that 
may arise with launching ASCMs are unintended weapons launch, and 
mistakenly identifying an ally as an adversary [45]. 
• Input Target Location: If future ASCM fire control systems are fully 
autonomous, potential hazards include mistakenly targeting an ally or 
infrastructure close to the coast, leading to civilian death or fratricide [45]. 
• Survive the Engagement: Potential safety hazards after surviving an 
engagement include the accuracy of all damaged components. For 
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example, if the damaged components are not communicating properly 
with their subsystems this could lead to collisions, inability to mitigate 
casualties, or even inadvertent firing of a weapon [45]. 
• Reduce Susceptibility: The system may not reduce its emissions as 
intended. For example, if the system is firing ordnance and the radars are 
not sectored properly it could cause an inadvertent explosion and damage 
the system [45]. 
• Increase Recoverability: No manning onboard these systems will be a 
disadvantage when fighting casualties (not inflicted by an adversary) such 
as fires and flooding. If the onboard systems are unable to contain the 
damage, multiple or all systems could be lost. Additionally, this could be 
an environmental concern with the threat of fuel and oil being discharged 
into the ocean [45]. 
In addition to the potential safety hazards that can arise with the associated Sea Hunter 
operations described in Figure 3, safety hazards that can arise during operational training 
environments and maintenance evolutions are important to mention here. The Battle Force 
Tactical Training (BFTT) system onboard U.S. Navy warships provides coordinated 
stimulation of shipboard combat systems to facilitate combat systems team training, 
providing the capability to conduct realistic joint warfare training across the spectrum of 
armed conflict and conduct realistic unit-level team training in all primary warfare areas 
[46]. BFTT accomplishes this by establishing a synthetic environment in which a tactical 
scenario is run to stimulate shipboard tactical equipment, resulting in coordinated team 
training events while ships are in-port or underway [46]. Using BFTT, sailors respond to 
simulated situations by performing multiple types of tasks, including turning keys and press 
buttons on their combat system equipment as if the ship’s crew was in a real-life 
engagement, building the confidence and gaining the experience needed to successfully 
engage threats. BFTT can be used by a single ship or be utilized by multiple ships to 
participate in training evolutions. 
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Future Sea Hunter variants will likely use BFTT to conduct combat system 
operational training, which in turn may lead to safety hazards arising. For example, BFTT 
could stimulate the Sea Hunter to direct fire on a target, but unless there is a safety interlock 
which prevents the weapons from releasing ordnance during training, the uncontrolled 
release of energy could result in a mishap.  
Similarly, safety hazards during maintenance evolutions may arise on future Sea 
Hunter variants. For example, on maintenance checks that require human interaction, the 
system could rotate/radiate weapon mounts or radars, resulting in a mishap on either the 
unmanned or manned vessels. 
STAMP/STPA might be used to address the safety hazards at multiple levels of the 
hierarchy as needed for each of the Sea Hunter’s modes of operation.  
b. Multi-level analysis  
The previous section discussed potential safety hazards from the high-level 
perspective of the functional hierarchy. This section will unwrap “3.0 Maneuver 
Tactically” from Figure 3 and discuss how STAMP/STPA can be applied from highest to 
the lowest control layer. This analysis can help define the risks and from that the 
mitigations and or testing requirements. Figure 4 is adapted from [8], it illustrates three 
hierarchical control layers of steering operations on Sea Hunter. Level 1 acts as the top-
level supervisory layer making decisions on when rudder movements should occur, think 
of this as Officer of the Deck and Navigator on a manned ship. Level 2 decides how to 
implement the commands passed from level 1, think of this as the Helmsman and Lee 
Helmsman on a manned ship. Level 3 is physically moving the rudder and monitoring the 
physical components to ensure proper operation, you can compare this to after steering on 
a manned ship. The illustration in Figure 4 is an implemented representation of the abstract 
hierarchy from Figure 2, discussed in Chapter IV. The Nav/OOD in Figure 4 is represented 
as “A” in Figure 2, while the Helm/Lee-Helm and After Steering are the subsystems. The 
components shown in Figure 4 are the different autonomous sensors that make decisions 
in level 1, and then pass down necessary instructions to the subsystems to operate all 
functions of the steering system. The dotted background at each level represents the 
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network mesh connecting sensors and nodes of the various autonomous sensors. The 
following describes how the different autonomous sensors would operate in the adapted 
Figure 4 example [8]: 
• The value judgement sensor has pre-set criteria for decisions the steering 
system will make on rudder adjustments, particularly compensating for 
environmental effects [8]. 
• The behavior generator works in tandem with the value judgement sensor 
and reports all rudder change decisions to the most superior level [8]. 
• The sensory processing sensor classifies surface targets as military or 
civilian with high levels of confidence. It will also identify floating debris 
and other floating objects to safely maneuver around [8]. 
• The world model sensor has access to relevant information available over 
communication links. It has the capability to track moving objects in real-
time and makes predictions about the contact picture [8]. 
• The knowledge database provides all knowledge to the system needed to 
safely navigate as a manned ship would. All decisions and 
recommendations a Nav/OOD would make will be retained in this 
database. It is the main sensor that feeds into every decision for the 
Steering system. The knowledge database at each level functions 
independently. For example, the knowledge database at level 1 is 
responsible for making contact picture decisions, while the knowledge 
database at level 3 simply ensures the physical components move correctly 
as commanded [8]. 
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[Key: Value Judgement (VJ), Behavior Generator (BG), Sensory Processing (SP), World 
Model (WM), Knowledge Database (KD)]. Source [8]. 
Figure 4. Sea Hunter Steering Hierarchical Control Layers. 
Adapted from [8]. 
Potential safety hazards at each level are: 
• Level 1: The system could fail to maneuver in accordance with 
COLREGS, due to misunderstanding the contact picture or not reacting to 
it, increasing the chances of collision. The system could fail to recognize 
that levels 2 and 3 are not executing the ordered commands, resulting in 
unsafe course corrections due to the delay. 
• Level 2: The system could apply the correct degree of rudder but not 
compensate for weather conditions and sea state, steering the vessel off 
course. The backup steering system could fail to recognize that the 
primary steering system is damaged or inoperable. 
• Level 3: The system could be sending a signal back to levels 1 and 2 
indicating the rudder is moving as intended, but the physical components 
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have not moved, leaving the rudder fixed and the ship sailing off course, 
leading to collision or running aground. 
These potential safety hazards for the Sea Hunter are the same safety hazards 
experienced on manned ships. The difference is, while the Sea Hunter is underway, there 
are no sailors to contain damage to the vessel or bridge watch standers onboard to navigate 
by sight if radars and other sensors are inoperable or malfunctioning. Interactions between 
subsystems may introduce new hazards, for example, communication errors can cause 
undesired behavior among systems installed on the vessel, or for interaction with other 
systems within the Fleet in order to perform cooperative-engagement tasks (e.g., launch-
on-remote).  The implementation of STAMP/STPA to a system like the Sea Hunter would 
inform the evaluation of safety requirements and design and implementation of safety 
constraints to ensure hazards are less likely to evolve into casualties.  
c. STPA Method Overview 
As discussed in Ch. 5 STPA can be used on complex systems like Sea Hunter to 
conduct a hazard analysis and identify casual factors of potential accidents. This section 
will discuss how to conduct a basic STPA analysis as outlined in [41]. The Sea Hunter 
steering system example from Figure 4 will be analyzed in this discussion. The basic STPA 
method has four steps that are illustrated in Figure 5 [41]. 
 
Figure 5. STPA Basic Steps. Adapted from [41]. 
The first step in the STPA method is to define the purpose of the analysis [41]. The first 
step is broken down into four parts: 
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1. Identify losses 
2. Identify system-level hazards 
3. Identify system-level constraints 
4. Refine hazards (optional) 
A loss is defined as something of value to stakeholders. Loss includes a loss of 
human life or human injury, property damage, environmental pollution, loss of mission, 
loss of reputation, loss or leak of sensitive information, or any other loss that is 
unacceptable to the stakeholders [41]. For this example, some basic loss scenarios have 
been discussed in Chapter VI Section B. a. which discusses Figure 3. STPA can be used 
by stakeholders to prioritize unacceptable losses they want identified during the analysis. 
Identifying system-level hazards is the process of identifying the boundaries of that 
particular system. Specifically, what subsystems are included in the system being analyzed. 
“The most useful way to define the system boundary for analysis purposes is to include the 
parts of the system over which the system designers have some control” [41]. For this 
example, identifying system-level hazards have been discussed in Figure 4. 
A system-level constraint is defined as a system condition or behavior that needs to 
be satisfied to prevent hazards, and ultimately to prevent losses [41]. These constraints can 
most readily be identified once the system-level hazards are identified. “System-level 
constraints should not specify a particular solution or implementation. Specifying a 
particular solution is usually premature at this early stage and can result in alternative and 
potentially better solutions being overlooked” [41]. For this example, the following system-
level constraints have been identified from the hazards discussed in Chapter VI Section B. 
b. with respect to Figure 4: 
• Level 1: The system must maneuver in accordance with COLREGS at all 
times, this will significantly decrease chances of collision. The system 
must receive an acknowledgement signal from the subsystems on levels 2 
and 3 to ensure rudder commands are executed. This includes signals from 
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level 2 and/or 3 indicating a degradation to the system that my impact the 
ability to follow COLREGS. 
• Level 2: The system must be able to compensate for incorrect rudder 
degree due to heavy weather conditions. The backup steering system must 
be able to recognize when the primary system is damaged or inoperable.  
• Level 3: The system must be able verify that the physical components are 
operating as they are directed to from level 1 and/or level 2. 
 Refining system-level hazards is the process of detailing the identified hazard into 
sub-hazards if applicable. Creating sub-hazards can be useful for complex systems such as 
the Sea Hunter. For this example, the following sub-hazards have been identified from 
level 3 hazards in the Figure 4 discussion: 
• Hazard: The system must be able verify that the physical components are 
operating as they are directed to from level 1. For example, if the 
command signal is interrupted from level 1 to 3 because of loose 
components, the physical components will not respond as directed. 
• Sub-hazard: Ensure all steering components are operable jointly 
and independently, to include the rudder, ram assembly, and 
lubrication systems. For example, a leak in the lubrication system 
that could cause gears to seize up. 
The second step in the STPA method is to model the hierarchical control structure. 
For this example, the hierarchical control structure is as illustrated in Figure 4. 
The third step in the STPA method is to identify unsafe control actions. An unsafe 
control action is defined as a control action that, in a particular context and operating 
environment, will lead to a hazard [41]. 
Table 1 represents four ways a control action can be unsafe, source [41]: 
1. Not providing the control action leads to a hazard. 
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2. Providing the control action incorrectly in some circumstance(s) leads to a 
hazard. 
3. Providing a potentially safe control action but too early, too late, or in the 
wrong order. 
4. The correct control action is incorrectly applied, e.g., for too long or is 
stopped too soon. 
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Unsafe control actions should specify the context in which the control action is 
unsafe [41]. For this example, specifying the weather conditions and putting them into 
context is critical. The weather conditions at sea often require different amounts for the 
degree of rudder to meet a navigational order. For example, high winds require more rudder 
to remain on course and favorable currents could require less rudder to remain on course. 
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For scheduled course changes, this context will be important if the rudder degree is set to 
a default turning degree for each turn. A small uncompensated offset on a course can put 
the system in danger of collision with fixed maritime objects or running aground. 
The fourth and final step in the STPA method is to identify loss scenarios. A loss 
scenario is defined as the causal factors that can lead to the unsafe control actions and 
create hazards [41]. Figure 6 [41] illustrates the relationship between the controller and the 
controlled process in potential loss scenarios. In this illustration, the controller will act as 
the level 3 aft steering and the controlled process is the movement of the rudders via the 
actuators. 
1. Why would Unsafe Control Actions occur? 
2. Why would control actions be improperly executed or not executed, 
leading to hazards? 
 
Figure 6. Two Potential Loss Scenarios That Must Be Considered When 
Assessing STPA Step 4. Source [41]. 
Loss scenarios that occur due to unsafe control actions may include failures related 
to the controller, inadequate control algorithm, unsafe control input, and inadequate 
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process control [41]. For this example, an unsafe control action for the steering system 
could be because of a power failure. A power failure in the steering system could occur for 
multiple reasons, including components which have loosened or been displaced out of 
place due to vibrations or pounding from high speeds or severe weather conditions. A 
second reason could be lubrication fluids shorting out components, small leaks can cause 
serious damage over long periods of time. A third reason could be a glitch in the system 
causing the system to reset and losing power for a short period of time. 
Identifying scenarios in which control actions are improperly executed or not 
executed involves factors that affect the control path as well as factors that affect the 
controlled process [41]. The control path is defined as the path that transfers control actions 
to the controlled process. Figure 7 [41], illustrates the control path down to the controlled 
process. In the current example, the controller in Figure 7 is the aft steering functionality 
and the controlled process is the movement of the rudders via the actuators. The control 
path will serve as the downward path from the controller to the controlled process 
(highlighted in red). Loss scenarios for this example on actions not executed might include 
a left rudder order from the controller to the actuator, but the actuator does not respond. 
Loss scenarios for this example on actions improperly executed might include a left 25-
degree rudder command, but the rudders only veer left by five degrees.  
 
Figure 7. Relationship between Controller and Controlled Process via the 
Control Path. Source [41]. 
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This level of detail and care is necessary when attempting to prevent safety hazards 
in fully autonomous weapon systems. Using STAMP/STPA on a system like Sea Hunter, 
the acquisition team will be able to identify where safety hazards exist in the control 
hierarchy and identify loss scenarios. Future variants of Sea Hunter will be trusted to 
operate more safely if a comprehensive and detailed hazard analysis is conducted prior to 
manufacturing and operational tasking, as well as review and maintenance of the hazard 
analysis as the system passes through upgrades in its life cycle. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Victorious warriors win first and then go to war, while defeated warriors go 
to war first and then seek to win 
—Sun Tzu, The Art of War 
As stated in the Introduction, the goal of this capstone was to explore whether the 
STAMP/STPA methodology might be useful in safety engineering of AWS, with the aim 
of informing the revision of existing policy and procedures to address AWS related system 
safety issues. To realize the promise of autonomous technology, the U.S. military must not 
only aggressively pursue its development, but also create policies that will allow it to be 
fielded in a timely manner. The U.S. military has several aviation autonomous drones and 
a fully autonomous Naval ship but does not have the policy and guidance for applying 
STAMP/STPA or a STAMP/STPA-like methodology to assess the safety of such systems 
from a sociotechnical, hierarchical control perspective. STAMP/STPA may be a means to 
bridge the gap, provided that the U.S. Navy includes the framework and methodology—or 
something akin to it—in its policy and guidance. STAMP/STPA is a possible approach to 
assessing the dependability of AI-based autonomous systems. This could an organization’s 
ability to provide the evidence that these systems are trustworthy in terms of the safety 
aspect of dependability. 
Some ideas for future research include: 
1. Collaborating with NOSSA to implement and test the STAMP/STPA 
method on a specific weapon system. 
2. Collaborating with DARPA and the Navy program office to implement 
and test the STAMP/STPA method on future variants of the Sea Hunter. 
3. Collaborating with the DOD to formulate new policy and guidance of 
software safety engineering, in addition to test and evaluation. 
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NOSSA, and the acquisition community should conduct further analysis to 
determine whether applying STAMP/STPA or similar techniques to address software 
safety in fully autonomous weapon systems would be beneficial.  
The Sea Hunter 1 displayed its ability to navigate and maneuver across the Pacific 
Ocean with few to no errors. As the Sea Hunter ship class begins to increase in numbers, 
these platforms will become major assets to the Navy fleet.  
A question will be asked: Should we develop and equip fully autonomous weapons? 
We may not have the luxury of a negative answer; the development of fully autonomous 
weapon systems may occur as result of peer pressure from our adversaries. Using STAMP, 
future variants of the Sea Hunter could be treated as a hierarchical control system, with 
decisions potentially being made at each level of control. The current policy direction for 
test and evaluation of autonomous systems focuses on failures, which is a system reliability 
concern. STAMP or a STAMP-like methodology might support acquisition of 
dependable—at least in the sense of the system safety—AI-based autonomous systems.  
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